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Lindsay Henderson, University of Southern Queensland1 
Introduction 
In 1979, the Welsh people rejected devolution in a referendum held, somewhat ironically, on 
St. David‘s Day, the Welsh equivalent of St. Patrick‘s Day.  The depth of the rejection of 
devolution – 80% of those who participated voted ‗no‘ – shook the section of Welsh society 
that had actively campaigned for cultural protection, Home Rule and independence within 
Britain.2   One nationalist, Hywel Teifi Edwards, argued that the nationalists‘ previous 
understanding of what it meant to be Welsh had been found wanting by the Welsh people 
themselves.3  The Welsh response to this ‗no‘ vote stretched wider than those who had 
actively campaigned for a change in the Welsh political situation, however.  Prior to 1979, 
those who actively supported the Welsh nationalist cause and advocated for the political 
recognition of a Welsh identity were a small group, primarily limited to the minority party 
of Plaid Cymru.  Over the ensuing decade, a wider variety of Welsh people, consisting 
largely of academics but also of politicians, members of Plaid Cymru,4 public servants, and 
other members of the educated Welsh, participated in the reshaping of the concept of 
national identity within Wales.  Most of these people were stung into action through a 
mixture of shock at the depth of the popular rejection of devolution, or through concern 
over the impact of Thatcherism on Wales and Welsh society and culture.   
 
Approaches to identity after 1979 
After the rejection of devolution and the perceived rejection of traditional Welsh language 
and culture, Plaid Cymru and the wider group of Welsh people began to re-examine the 
1970s approaches to Welsh identity.  The section of the Welsh population actively involved 
in this process was quite wide and united only by their interest in Wales as a nation and a 
people.  Even those who could be classified as nationalists varied substantially in their 
understanding of what that classification meant.  Plaid Cymru under Gwynfor Evans 
maintained a very narrow definition, requiring a deep commitment to the Welsh language, 
to Welsh traditional culture, to Welsh Home Rule, and to a militant rejection of English-
language Welsh culture and the existent relationship between Wales and England.  Much 
of the conflict between this idea of Welsh identity and the reality of the lived Welsh 
experience, however, only became apparent after the rejection of devolution.  It became 
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2 G.H. Jenkins, A Concise History of Wales (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.297. 
3 John Davies, A History of Wales (London: Penguin, 1994), p.677. 
4 Plaid Cymru is the nationalist party of Wales.  A direct translation of their name is ‗Party of Wales.‘ 
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necessary for those concerned about the devolution result to attempt to grasp the way in 
which the Welsh people viewed these concepts.  For the purposes of this analysis, this 
disparate group of people will be referred to as the nationalist-inclined Welsh intelligentsia.  
All were educated, thoughtful participants in the debate evident in the 1970s and the 1980s 
and played a major role in the effort to grasp the shape of a modern Wales and Welshness.  
While a part of this debate occurred within the public arena, on television, radio and in the 
newspapers, much of it made its way into three Welsh English-language journals.  The 
three journals in which this group of people published most of the English-language debate 
were Planet, the New Welsh Review, and Contemporary Wales.  
The debate evident in Planet, Contemporary Wales, the New Welsh Review, and the 
relevant policy pamphlets, and Plaid Cymru manifestoes throughout the 1970s focused on 
the need for the rebalancing of the Welsh-English relationship to allow for the protection 
and continued development of Welsh culture and society.  Forced Union with England in 
Britain was increasingly being perceived by the Welsh intelligentsia as limiting the 
construction of Welsh political, cultural and economic identities.  The Welsh intelligentsia 
were not, however, united over the way in which the Union was problematic for these areas, 
or how it should be corrected. 
 
Treaties of unity and Welsh identity 
One form of correction was suggested by Tom Nairn, who argued that the development of 
Welsh and Scottish political and cultural identities was laying the groundwork for the 
revision of the treaties of Union.5  Raymond Williams picked up on Tom Nairn‘s argument, 
pointing out that without this revision of the Treaties and, therefore, of the historical 
relationship between Wales and England, Welsh political identity in particular would not 
be able to reach its full potential.6  Furthermore, the colonial nature of the relationship 
forced much of Welsh political and economic expression into line with that of England.  
Brian Davies argued that this imposed an artificial divided between the Welsh working 
class who were the most closely associated with the modern British economy and, therefore, 
the English language, and the more non-British Welsh nationalism of Plaid Cymru.7  This 
disassociation of the grass-roots population from its version of Welsh identity hindered 
Plaid Cymru‘s efforts to alter the politically colonial relationship or to further develop Welsh 
political identity.  For Bobi Jones, this divide within Welsh society was only reinforced by 
                                                 
5 Tom Nairn, ‗Scotland and Wales: Notes on nationalist pre-history‘, Planet 34 (1976), pp.1-11. 
6 Raymond Williams, 2003.  Who speaks for Wales?  Nation, culture and identity (Cardiff: University of Wales 
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the fact that English economic and political dominance had resulted in a Welsh inferiority 
complex regarding their language and culture. 8   The 1970s Welsh intelligentsia were 
united in their belief that the historical shape of the political Welsh-English relationship 
was no longer functioning to the benefit of the Welsh people and needed to be revised. 
None of these members of the Welsh intelligentsia considered the possibility that 
Wales was not, in fact moving automatically towards regaining its political identity as a 
devolved country.  All of the authors argued that changes would occur to the relationship 
between Wales and England – needed to occur in order to redress the political imbalance 
between Wales and England.  The ‗no‘ vote in the 1979 devolution referendum came as a 
serious shock for many among the Welsh intelligentsia.  Indeed, the analysis of the reasons 
for the unexpected rejection of devolution is still on-going.9 
One immediate result of the popular rejection of devolution was a temporary 
cessation of the debate over the nature of the Welsh-English political relationship.  When 
the journals recommenced publication in the mid-1980s, the debate that also reappeared had 
shifted gears in response to the substantial Welsh swings towards the Conservative Party 
in the 1979 and 1983 general elections.  Welsh voters appeared to be rejecting the radical 
Welsh past, expressed through voting for the Liberal and Labour parties, shifting into a 
voting pattern very similar to that of England.  When this shift was combined with the 
rejection of devolution, it appeared almost a final confirmation of the disappearance of a 
distinctive form of Welsh political expression.  Assimilation into England seemed to be 
reducing Wales to a region rather than a nation.  Even the increased participation in direct 
action groups aimed to protect Welsh interests was interpreted by some members of the 
Welsh intelligentsia as evidence of the continuation of the historical process of Welsh 
political assimilation into Britain.10  From this perspective, Welsh political identity would 
be limited to that of a ‘sturdy dwarf’ who must exist beneath the dominant British culture 
and prove unable to grow beyond that position.11 
The debate over the meaning of the rejection of devolution and the increased Welsh 
Conservative vote evolved into a reconsideration of the roles and natures of the political 
parties within Wales.  During the 1970s, the inability of the British political parties to cater 
adequately for Wales had been an accepted fact amongst the nationalist-inclined Welsh 
intelligentsia.  By the late 1980s, after nearly a decade of Conservative government, and the 
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steady rejection of its 1970s projection of Welsh political identity, Plaid Cymru itself had 
been forced to come to terms with its popular rejection in 1979 and at repeated General 
Elections.  Under Dafydd Wigley and later Dafydd Elis Thomas, Plaid Cymru attempted to 
adapt themselves to the apparent reality of a people who accepted the shape of the union 
between England and Wales.12  For some Welsh nationalists, however, Plaid Cymru‘s efforts 
to represent the Welsh nation as it was rather than as it should be, undermined the Party‘s 
ability to defend the Welsh language and the integrity of the Welsh language heartlands.13  
Without the distinctive Welsh language heartlands, the Welsh claim for a separate political 
identity was dangerously undermined.  Without a base in traditional, Welsh-speaking 
Welshness, Thomas argued that Plaid Cymru would be inhibited from building a nation able 
to distinguish itself from England.  Anglo-Welsh culture was not well enough defined or 
strong enough to withstand pressure from English culture.14  The popular rejection of 
devolution and the ideas that accompanied it was not sufficient cause to abandon those ideas. 
Yet the argument also went in the other direction.  Geraint Morgan raised the 
question of the Welshness of the Welsh branch of the Conservative Party, pointing out that 
not only had they passed legislation that was beneficial to Wales but that, on occasion, they 
were more in touch with the Welsh people than either Plaid Cymru or the Labour Party.15  
This had been evidenced by Conservative opposition to devolution in 1979 in favour of a 
stronger Home Office – an institution created by the Conservative Party itself.   Morgan did 
conclude that, despite these occasional achievements, the Conservative lack of sympathy 
with the Welsh nationalist aspirations prevented them from being truly Welsh.16  Prior to 
the 1980s, however, the mere consideration of the Welshness of the Conservative Party 
would have seemed irrelevant in a society dominated by Labour and renowned for its 
rejection of the Anglicised Conservative Party.  Yet by the mid 1980s, the question could be 
asked, indicating a growing openness to the consideration of the validity of Welsh identities 
outside of the traditional one.  A section of the Welsh intelligentsia, including the leaders of 
Plaid Cymru, were becoming more consciously appreciative of what it meant to be 
practically as well as traditionally Welsh.  
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15 Geraint Morgan, ‗How Welsh are the Welsh Conservatives?‘, Planet 54 (1985/1986), pp. 60-64. 
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Attitudes in the 1980s 
Thatcherism and the evolution of political expression in Wales, as well as the economic-
triggered disassociation from Westminster politics, encouraged the Welsh intelligentsia 
into questioning the structure and shape, and even the continued existence of a Welsh 
expression of political identity.  This questioning was shaped, however, by the rejection of 
devolution.  The confidence of the 1970s is notably lacking in the 1980s journal articles, and 
the effort to come to terms with the reality of the political situation quite different from 
1970s focus on what would or needed to occur in the Welsh future.  By the end of the 1980s, 
the Welsh intelligentsia were searching not only for the political meaning of Wales, but for 
ways in which Wales could find a political identity without reliance on the groundwork of 
Plaid Cymru or traditional Welshness.  The political relationship between Wales and 
England in Britain had been opened to new analysis by the devolution referendum and 
shaped by the experience of Thatcherism. 
 The Welsh people‘s attitude towards culture in Wales, as expressed in the 1979 
referendum, would also take the Welsh intelligentsia by surprise.  Up until 1979, the bulk of 
the interested intelligentsia focused on the use of the Welsh and English languages within 
Wales and on the relative positions and status of the two languages.  By the end of the 
decade, the intelligentsia were expressing increased interest in breaking the deadlock 
between the two linguistic expressions of Wales and Welshness.  Yet when these articles 
are compared with a later Public Policy Pamphlet,17 what is striking is the complete lack of 
awareness on the behalf of the Welsh intelligentsia that the majority of the Welsh 
population was approaching the issues of cultural identity and language from a very 
different perspective.  76% of the Welsh people surveyed by researchers from the University 
of Strathclyde did not associate a Welsh identity with either the Welsh language or any 
form of nationalism. 18   Welsh identity could viably be expressed through the English 
language and within Britain.  The 1979 devolution referendum forced the awareness of this 
difference into full view.  Plaid Cymru had been the main supporter of devolution and, with 
Labour internally divided over its own proposal, had run the majority of the ‗yes‘ campaign.  
Correspondingly, Plaid Cymru‘s understanding of Welsh cultural identity had been attached 
to the concept of devolution, sparking fears amongst the English-speaking Welsh of a 
country dominated by the minority Welsh-speakers (and vice versa) and of the reinforcing 
of a north-south divide.  Plaid Cymru‘s understanding of Welsh identity was, therefore, one 
                                                 
17 Denis Balsom, Peter Madgwick & Denis Van Mechelen, The Political Consequences of Welsh Identity 
(University of Strathclyde, Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 1982), p.1. 
18 Balsom, Madgwick & Van Mechelen, The Political Consequences of Welsh Identity, p.2, fig.1. 
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of the points rejected by 80% of those who voted in 1979.  With this popular disavowal of 
traditional Welshness, the Welsh intelligentsia were forced to become more open to 
acknowledging the reality and validity of an English-speaking Welsh identity.  Many of the 
arguments that had been used by the intelligentsia and Plaid Cymru to problematise the 
latter identity now found themselves being problematised in turn. 
 In the 1970s, however, the discussion of Welsh culture amongst the intelligentsia 
focused on the need to strengthen Welsh culture and the problems that appeared inherent 
to the emergence of a unified culture.  The lack of a common experiential ground for the 
construction of a Welsh identity was, as with the issue of political identity and independence, 
based firmly in Welsh history.  English was, and is, the language of the dominant nation, of 
the conquerors, but economic and political participation in Britain required, and still does, 
the ability to speak and work in English.  By 1971, only 21% of the population above the age 
of three were able to speak Welsh.19  Correspondingly, the central question for the Welsh 
intelligentsia of the 1970s was whether or not it was possible for the English language, the 
language of necessity and of conquest, to express a Welsh identity.  The status of the Welsh 
language, particularly in terms of its position relative to English, was central to this 
question. 
  
The question of language 
Plaid Cymru and Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg represented one approach to this issue.  Both 
groups denied the validity of an English-speaking Welsh culture, relegating Welsh 
literature written in English to England and regional English culture.  Hence, Cymdeithas yr 
Iaith Gymraeg’s proposed to divide Wales along the linguistic North-South boundary.20  
Traditional Welshness needed to be protected from the ravages of the English and their 
language, an argument that revealed the antagonism and lack of sympathy between those 
committed to either language-culture in Wales.21   Some of the intelligentsia, however, 
responded to this antagonism by refusing to deny the validity of either language within 
Welsh culture, arguing instead that both deserved equal respect.  Where mutual respect 
was not given, resentment, dislike and division was the result, damaging Wales further.22  A 
similar result occurred when Welsh-learners were rejected by established Welsh-speakers.23 
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20 Ned Thomas, ‗Socialism and the two-Wales model‘, Planet 14 (1972), pp.3-9. 
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Antagonism between the two groups would not contribute to the emergence of a strong 
Welsh identity.  Towards the end of the decade, Raymond Williams took this approach to 
its logical conclusion.  His two essays ‘The Welsh Industrial Novel’ (1979) and ‗The Welsh 
Trilogy and The Volunteers’ (1979) presented Welsh literature of both languages as 
emergent from Welsh experience. 24   The language used was part of that experience.  
English-language literature could be just as nationalist as that written in Welsh, as the 
spate of anti-investiture writing in the early 1970s had illustrated.  For Raymond Williams, 
the problem was not the presence of the English language, but the nature of the umbrella 
state of Britain, a state that embodied the colonial baggage of conquest and dominance in 
the English language.  Raymond Williams was, however, quite a bit ahead of his time in 
shifting the locus away from the actual language to the baggage that language brought with 
it.  Prior to his essays, similar examination had been limited to the baggage brought by 
Welsh history.  For Bobi Jones25 and Tecwyn Lloyd26, the solution to the division in Welsh 
cultural identity lay more in understanding the historical way in which the Welsh 
inferiority complex had emerged and how it had shaped the Welsh people‘s attitudes 
towards their culture and identity.  Language itself was not the central problem, rather the 
historical apportioning of value to Welsh and English was.  But regardless of the approach, 
the Welsh intelligentsia believed that the balance between Wales and England in Britain 
needed to be adjusted psychologically as well as politically. 
 During the 1980s, this concern over language and the question of whether Welsh 
identity could be expressed through English evolved into a growing acceptance of the 
validity of the English-language Welsh culture and identity.  Being Welsh became more 
important than the language used to express that identity.  This was evident in a trio of 
articles on the rejection of English-language Welsh literature.  Peter MacDonald Smith 
argued that such literature was shaped by the authors‘ Welshness, regardless of language, 
and expressed a commitment towards both Welsh literature and culture that equalled that 
of the Welsh-language equivalents27.  G.O.Jones challenged two other questions that had, in 
the 1970s, been used to discredit English-language Welsh culture: 
…are the Welsh people who do not speak Welsh ‗truly‘ Welsh 
[and] are Welsh writers who write in English and choose their own 
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themes Anglo-Welsh even if they do not write about Wales, or 
‗truly‘ Anglo-Welsh if they do not write about the ‗colonial 
predicament‘ of Wales?28  
 
He pointed out that to deny a Welsh identity to four-fifths of the population because they 
did not speak Welsh, or to impose limits on literature not found anywhere else, defied 
logic.29  This logical deficiency was not a new discovery, but the rejection of traditional 
Welshness along with devolution forced the intelligentsia to respond by challenging the 
artificial boundaries imposed by traditional Welshness on identity within Wales.  The 
tendency of Welsh nationalists to position a valid Welsh identity and culture in opposition 
to that of England and Britain was also being questioned.  English was no longer 
necessarily problematic.  The English-speaking Welsh had made their point in 1979. 
 This did not mean, however, that the Welsh intelligentsia‘s concern over the state of 
the Welsh language vanished or even declined.  In fact, in the wake of the 1979 referendum, 
the Welsh intelligentsia‘s approach to general cultural identity had become both more 
practical and more searching, challenging the more idealistic and nationalist boundaries that 
had previously defined Welshness.  No definitive answers were outlined in any of the above 
articles, but all were more open to a wider understanding of Welsh identity than was 
evident in the 1970s.  That this widening appeared to be accompanied by the growth of 
confidence in the equality of Welsh and Welsh-language culture with that across the border 
in England is a development that reflects another impact of Thatcherism on the Welsh 
people.  Through the forced self-reliance of Thatcherism, the Welsh confidence in 
themselves and their abilities increased slowly but steadily. 
  
The Welsh economy 
A similar increase in self-confidence would emerge in the economic arena in the 1980s, 
something that was notably lacking amongst the Welsh population by the 1979 devolution 
referendum.  The 1970s were economically difficult, particularly in contrast with the 1950s 
and 1960s but it was, at least in part, concern over Britain‘s relative decline that cast the 
biggest shadow across the economic scene.  It is, however, important to recognise that the 
import of the economic developments of the early 1970s – the entry into the EC, the 
floating of the pound sterling, the gradual rise of inflation – were not fully grasped until late 
in the decade.  Thus, the Welsh economic position could seem strong enough for 
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independence in the early 1970s and still receive a popular and resounding rejection at the 
1979 devolution referendum. 
 The focus of the debate over the economic relationship was, again, on the colonial 
nature of the Welsh economy.  Arguments regarding capitalism, imperialism and the 
political concept of the underdeveloped nation all found expression. 30   Yet again, the 
dominance of England was identified as a problem, preventing the Welsh development of 
the foundations of a self-sustaining economy.  Britain, built to foster the economic prowess 
of an Empire centred on England, was increasingly being seen as, at best, semi-functional in 
the modern world.  This questioning of the existing economic structure of Britain was not 
limited to Wales.  The English and Scottish peoples were also searching for new ways of 
defining the economic identity if Britain.  In all three countries, the European Community 
became a steadily more attractive option.  Prior to British entry into the EC in 1973, Plaid 
Cymru offered a solution to the problems that had emerged from the colonial and imperial 
economic relationship in the form of a Britain consisting of free trade zones with 
interdependent economies (c.1966-1970).  In this new Britain, entry into the EC would be 
renegotiated in order to prevent the dominance of English issues stunting Welsh growth 
and activity within and through the European organisation. 31   Again, the nature and 
structure of the British relationship was identified as the primary issue, rather than the mere 
existence of the relationship. 
 Not all of the Welsh intelligentsia participating in the 1970s debate accepted the 
feasibility of Plaid Cymru‘s alternative British structure.  The concept of a colonial or in any 
way exploitative economic relationship between England and Wales was, in fact, a 
controversial claim.  A large section of the Welsh intelligentsia challenged the applicability 
of the concepts of exploitation and intentional misuse of Welsh economic resources.  One 
member, economist John Lovering, denied Plaid Cymru‘s assertion that Wales was 
economically self-sufficient and therefore able to function outside of Britain. 32   This 
approach to the Welsh economy was more practical and less idealistic than that of Plaid 
Cymru, accepting the reality of 700 years of steadily consolidated economic integration.  It 
was certainly the argument that resonated with the Welsh people, as was illustrated by 
their rejection of Plaid Cymru‘s alternative in the 1979 devolution referendum.  Much of the 
                                                 
30 See Brian Davies, ‗Towards a new synthesis‘, Planet 37, 8 (1977), pp.56-59 and Graham Day, 
‗Underdeveloped Wales‘, Planet 45, 6 (1978), pp.104-107 for arguments regarding Wales as an undeveloped 
nation.  
31 Plaid Cymru, Action for Wales.  General Election Manifesto (Bangor: Elwyn Roberts, c.1966-1970). 
32 John Lovering, ‗The theory of the internal colony‘, Planet 45, 6 (1978), pp.89-96; Lovering, ‗The theory of 
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resentment of the Welsh economic ties to England apparent in Plaid Cymru‘s approach was, 
ultimately, historical.  They were protesting against ties enforced through conquest and 
involuntary union, rather than chosen and participated in on an equal basis.  The Welsh 
people were more concerned about the economic problems that were unpleasantly apparent 
by 1979, and saw their safest economic future within Britain. 
 By the end of the 1980s, the issue of Welsh economic independence from a colonial 
relationship had vanished, destroyed by the 1979 devolution referendum and the experience 
of Thatcherism.  The majority of the Welsh intelligentsia were united in their concern over 
the negative impact of Thatcherist economic policies on the Welsh economy and society.  
Thatcherism, by its very nature, ignored the society within which the economy functioned, 
something that was perceived by the Welsh intelligentsia as contributing to the destruction 
of a distinctive Welsh economic society.  This was particularly the case regarding the coal-
mining communities of South Wales.33  Most of the Welsh intelligentsia were united in the 
belief that economic competitiveness should be tempered by an assessment of the needs of 
the community.34  This was particularly necessary as the closure of the mines and steel 
refineries signalled the end of a century-old community and way of life, and resulted in the 
inability of those left behind to see a future for themselves or their children.35  The failure of 
the Conservative government to develop Welsh infrastructure and foster replacement 
industries in the South exacerbated the problematic economic and social situation.36  By the 
end of the 1980s, it was clear that the Welsh intelligentsia blamed Thatcher‘s economic and 
social policies for the poor state of the Welsh economy and the extremely high 
unemployment rates in the old coal-mining areas.  Yet none of the articles rejected the 
Welsh ties to the British economy.  The protests were in relation to the policies that were 
emerging from Westminster, and many of their concerns were shared by English regional 
intelligentsia. 
Thatcherism did, however, have one positive effect on the Welsh perception of their 
economy, if not on their economy in and of itself.  Thatcher‘s withdrawal of the level of state 
aid previously available to Wales forced the Welsh realisation that the Welsh were not 
                                                 
33 Please see Kenneth D. George & Lynn Mainwaring (1987: 7-37), Victoria Wass & Lynn Mainwaring (1989: 
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actually economically reliant on British government hand-outs.37  Thatcherite economic 
decentralisation developed Welsh state machinery and Welsh self-confidence in their ability 
to guide and develop their own economy.  The Conservative Part had propagated ‗…an 
ideology of Welsh success…‘ 38  and had encouraged the popular realisation that ‗…an 
interventionist Welsh state can accomplish more for them than a dependence inherent in a 
centralist British Labourism‘.39  This increase of self-confidence was also visible in the 
change in the Welsh intelligentsia‘s approach to Welsh cultural identity and contributed 
towards the shift regarding devolution in the later 1980s. 
Plaid Cymru‘s approach to the Welsh-English relationship during the 1970s 
contributed to rejection of devolution in 1979.  This approach had been supported by the 
bulk of the nationalist-inclined Welsh intelligentsia who had argued that Wales was 
crippled politically, culturally and economically by the dominance of England.  Labour‘s 
devolution proposal was, in itself, quite controversial, due to its limited nature, the potential 
dissolution of the British Unions, and Plaid Cymru‘s insistence on basing the need for 
devolution on cultural rather than economic grounds.40  Ultimately, the arguments over 
devolution did little to reassure the general public in Wales that devolution would be 
beneficial, politically, economically or culturally.  The arguments against the proposal were 
far more convincing, touching on the fears of the Welsh populace of the domination of one 
group or the other, of an ineffective, expensive and democratically unsound addition to the 
tiers of government, and of the Welsh inability to prosper in a devolved state.  This success 
was evident in that of the 58.3% of the Welsh electorate who voted, 956 330 voted against 
the proposal, with 243 048 in favour.41  All eight counties returned a ‗no‘ vote.42  The Welsh 
people were far more concerned about the potential problems with devolution and the 
dangers of being exposed to the ongoing industrial unrest without the protection of the 
British state than they were about the limiting factors of the union with England in Britain. 
The experience of the 1980s and Thatcherism, however, would begin to change the 
public perception of devolution.  More than that, however, it altered the intelligentsia‘s 
motivations for altering the union between Wales and England.  Devolution became an 
alteration to an unacceptable form of government, not the potential prelude to the 
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dissolution of Britain.  In the light of the effects of Thatcherism within Wales, such an 
argument appeared more relevant to the general public than the more nationalist and 
culturally and linguistically defensive arguments of the 1970s.  In fact, the rejection of 
devolution in 1979 began to be understood on these grounds.  According to Charlotte H. 
Aull, Welsh nationalism was associated with the encroachment of state bureaucracy on local 
government and the economy.43  Neither had been particularly under threat in 1979.  What 
had been rejected in the referendum was, therefore, not devolution, but the potential 
legitimisation of the political existence of Wales.44  This approach was reiterated in the late 
1980s by Hefin, underlining the importance of the Welsh experience of Thatcherism for the 
revitalising of a more practical form of devolution. 45   Furthermore, the economic 
decentralisation favoured by the Thatcher government had developed Welsh self-confidence 
in their ability to guide and develop their own economy.46  In contrast, the increasing 
marginalisation of local government in favour of Thatcherite political centralisation 
brought that section of the Welsh population onto the side of the devolutionists for the first 
time.47  Thatcherism, then, played a major role in the return of devolution to the Welsh 
political agenda in the late 1980s, as well as shaping the Welsh intelligentsia‘s 
understanding of the rejection of devolution in 1979.  Her politics and economics forced the 
Welsh intelligentsia and the Welsh people to reconsider the viability of the structure of 
Britain.  The Welsh-English relationship had become negotiable again, albeit from a very 
different perspective. 
 
Conclusion 
Over the 1980s, the majority of the Welsh intelligentsia who participated in this debate over 
Wales, Welshness and the Welsh-English relationship shifted towards this widening of the 
boundaries that had previously surrounded these three concepts.  In 1979, the Welsh people 
had made it clear that they did not wish to participate in the nationalist understandings of 
these areas, and did not wish their identity to be limited by the language they spoke.  The 
shock of this response is still evident in the modern analyses of the rejection of devolution.  
Yet this shock forced the Welsh intelligentsia into reconsidering their understanding of 
Wales, Welshness and the Welsh-English relationship.  English-language Welsh culture 
became a more acceptable version of Welsh culture, as did the identity that was associated 
                                                 
43 Charlotte H. Aull, ‗Nationalism after the referendum‘, Planet, 49/50 (1980), pp.64-70. 
44 Aull, ‗Nationalism after the referendum‘, pp.64-70. 
45 Hefin Williams, ‗Talking about the referendum‘,  Planet 72 (1988/1989), pp.71-80. 
46 Williams, ‗The state without the people‘, pp.19-24. 
47 Osmund, ‗Dreaded devolution‘, pp.116-117. 
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with it.  Wales began to be positioned less against England and more in the light of its own 
values, achievements and potential.  Both the economic and political relationships between 
Wales and England became open to more pragmatic negotiation.  All of this meant that the 
gap between the general public‘s understanding of Wales, Welshness and the Welsh-
English relationship and that of the Welsh intelligentsia began to narrow.  This, in turn, 
was reflected in the public support of devolution in 1997. 
 The articles in Planet, Contemporary Wales and the New Welsh Review offer unique 
insight into how the intelligentsia‘s approach to Wales, Welshness and the Welsh-English 
relationship altered and developed in the wake of the 1979 devolution referendum.  The 
debate that occurred and the changes in the understanding of these areas are highly 
significant for understanding modern Wales and its identity.  The rejection of devolution in 
1979 was the catalyst for this re-evaluation, one that was shaped by the experiences of the 
1980s. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
